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This month saw another in a long line of European Council summits aimed at reforming the
institutional framework of the eurozone. Uwe Puetter looks at the rise of deliberative
intergovernmentalism in the European Union through European Council summits, and finds
that while agreement is required at the highest level to make this system work, the process is
remarkably stable.
The European Council recently met in Brussels to discuss the recurrent issue of  ref orming
the institutional f ramework of  Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) including the tricky
question of  coordinating domestic budgetary policies more ef f ectively. Banking union was also discussed.
As usual the meeting triggered a great deal of  media attention and Europe’s top policy-makers were quite
talkative ahead of  the summit. Herr (French President Francois) Hollande expressed impatience with the
decision-making on euro area ref orm and the question of  EU-level bank bailout schemes, and Madame
(German Chancellor Angela) Merkel replied that this meeting was about discussing these issues f urther –
not about making a f inal decision. She stressed that this was on the agenda only f or the next meeting. Yet,
the Franco-German couple as well as all the other “heads” knew in any case that there soon will be another
opportunity to sort these things out: the next European Council meeting.
What I f ound more interesting in this regard was
another statement by Hollande published in Le Monde
on 17 October, the day bef ore the European Council.
The French president demanded monthly meetings of
the heads – at least f or the euro area. He expressed
dissatisf action with the notion of  European Council
crisis meetings and called f or emphasising continuity
instead. This was an idea also f amiliar to some of
Merkel’s EU af f airs aides in the chancellery in Berlin.
On the day bef ore the European Council meeting I
listened to a programme on German national radio
Deutschlandf unk with the tit le “The euro crisis and its
managers”. The program f eatured Thomas Wieser,
the Austrian senior civil servant, who chairs the
Eurogroup Working Group – the of f spring of  the
Economic and Financial Committee which brings
together the euro area’s deputy f inance ministers and
prepares all Eurogroup meetings and, increasingly, the
EMU related agenda points f or the European Council. I know who he is but who else does? Yet, we learn
why Wieser is an important man in Brussels. Instead of  sitt ing in his empty of f ice (also mentioned in the
programme) he spends most of  his t ime in meetings and talking to top- level decision-makers. What is his
role in all this? “I am something like a marriage counsellor who tries – between two or several partners, if
one accepts polygamy – to achieve a common understanding of  things and seeks to make sure that
operational implementation gets underway”, says Wieser.
This is in a nutshell what I think the currently most important institutional trend in EU policy-making is. What
we are seeing is a new European intergovernmentalism. It is a dif f erent type of  intergovernmentalism. It is
not what was ref erred to as the opposite model of  polit ical integration in Europe. Instead of  standstill there
is a continuous intensif ication of  top- level intergovernmental policy coordination. Instead of  legislative
decision-making there is agreement on commonly shared policy objectives which is reiterated on a regular
basis. Implementation is f ully dependent on the polit ical self -commitment of  member state representatives
in the European Council and the Council of  the European Union. To make this system work agreement is
required at the highest level. Individual ministers of ten simply lack the authority within the domestic context
to guarantee implementation. This is a lesson f rom the open method coordination experience of  the early
2000s. This is why the European Council becomes an ef f ective supervisor of  the relevant Council
f ormations and the Eurogroup. This is why the heads get involved in day-to-day decision-making.
There is disagreement and there are conf licts, of  course and one should expect this given what is at stake.
Yet, the process as such is remarkably stable. It seems that the more problems occur the more f requent are
the meetings. The heads themselves are overseeing this process. The Council and the Eurogroup receive
instructions. Meetings among ministers in the relevant areas become more f requent too. Moreover,
European Council and Council activity involves the emergence and continuing expansion of  a sophisticated
system of  comitology. All these processes including the underlying bureaucratic inf rastructure – committees
like the one chaired by Wieser or the inf luential Polit ical and Security Committee – are geared towards
consensus seeking among member state governments. Because of  this f ocus on institutionalising
collective processes of  policy deliberation I have ref erred to this new institutional dynamic as deliberative
intergovernmentalism.
It is the key mode of  governance especially in areas such as economic policy and f oreign and security
policy. Even on issues which involve classic community method decision-making – such as in the case of
the ref orm of  banking supervision – the power to init iate and shape policy is not so much with the
Commission anymore but with the European Council. Moreover, policy instruments and implementation
resources are all decentralised and located at the national level. It all started with the Maastricht Treaty and
the decision to develop economic governance and f oreign and security policy outside the community
method. The crucial point is that these processes not only constitute new modes of  governance but over
time also triggered a process of  prof ound institutional change. We can trace numerous attempts at
institutional engineering aimed at enhancing the problem-solving capacity of  f orums like the Eurogroup, the
relevant Council f ormations and, most recently under the supervision of  its new f ull- t ime president, the
European Council. The creation of  the of f ice of  a f ull- t ime president (currently held by Herman van
Rompuy) of  the European Council is a f unction of  this dynamic too.
Read more on this: Uwe Puetter, Europe’s deliberative intergovernmentalism: the role of the Council and
European Council in EU economic governance, Journal of European Public Policy 19:2, pp. 161-178, 2012.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit .ly/EUSumm
 _________________________________
About the author 
Uwe Puetter – Central European University
Uwe Puetter is Prof essor at the Department of  Public Policy and Director of  the Center f or
European Union Research (CEUR) at Central European University, Budapest. He holds the
Jean Monnet Chair in European Public Policy and Governance. His main research is on
governance and processes of  institutional change in EU economic governance, social and
employment policy as well as f oreign and security policy. His recent research analyses the
changing role of  the European Council and the Council in EU decision-making af ter the
Maastricht Treaty.
